Questioning the Role of Requirements Engineering in the Causes of Safety-Critical Software Failures by Holloway, C. M. & Johnson, C. W.
  Questioning the Role of Requirements Engineering in the Causes 
of Safety-Critical Software Failures 
C. W. Johnson†, C. M. Holloway* 
† Dept. of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 9QQ, johnson@dcs.gla.ac.uk  
*NASA Langley Research Center, 100 NASA Road, Hampton VA 23681-2199, U.S.A, c.m.holloway@nasa.gov  
 
Keywords: software failures, requirements engineering, 
accident analysis, fallacious reasoning 
Abstract 
Many software failures stem from inadequate requirements 
engineering.   This view has been supported both by detailed 
accident investigations and by a number of empirical studies; 
however, such investigations can be misleading.   It is often 
difficult to distinguish between failures in requirements 
engineering and problems elsewhere in the software 
development lifecycle.   Further pitfalls arise from the 
assumption that inadequate requirements engineering is a 
cause of all software related accidents for which the system 
fails to meet its requirements.  This paper identifies some of 
the problems that have arisen from an undue focus on the role 
of requirements engineering in the causes of major accidents.  
The intention is to provoke further debate within the 
emerging field of forensic software engineering. 
1 Introduction 
The last twenty years have seen a move away from the 
‘perfective approach’ in accident investigation [1].  Rather 
than blaming the operators who directly control complex 
applications processes, there has been an increasing tendency 
to identify the underlying latent and distal causes of adverse 
events, such as poor safety management [2].    
 
There have been similar changes in forensic software 
engineering.  Investigators have looked beyond particular 
bugs to identify problems in the wider procurement and 
management of large IT projects.   In particular, there has 
been a growing emphasis on requirements engineering in the 
causes of adverse events.  Leveson has argued that “most 
software reliability models define failures in terms of 
deviations from the software requirements specification; most 
accidents involving software are due to errors in the software 
requirements specification” [3].   
 
Similarly, Ladkin’s analysis of the loss of Ariane 5 focuses on 
requirements errors rather than programming failures: “the 
program was written against Ariane 4 requirements; these 
requirements were not transferred to the Ariane 5 
requirements spec; the Ariane 5 requirements therefore did 
not state the range requirement; the (implicit in Ariane 5) 
range requirement was in conflict with the behavior of Ariane 
5 (as in fact explicated in other Ariane 5 requirements); 
requirements came up against behavior and the rocket was 
destroyed. (It is not surprising that it was a requirements error 
- over 90% of safety-critical systems failures are requirements 
errors, according to a JPL study that has become folklore, as 
well as Knight-Leveson, I believe.)” [4].  
 
The following, partial list provides examples of the types of 
problems that can arise during these early stages of 
development: 
 
1. lack of stakeholder involvement. The end-users who 
arguably know most about day to day operation may not 
be sufficiently consulted in the early stages of 
development.   
2. incorrect environmental assumptions. Neumann's 
collection of computer related risks contains numerous 
examples of variables that have fallen above or below 
their anticipated ranges during 'normal' operation [5]. 
3. communications failures within development teams. 
Software engineers must often rely upon information 
provided by domain experts. Problems arise when these 
specialists must communicate technical expertise to 
people from other disciplines [6]. 
4. inadequate conflict management. Different stakeholders 
can hold radically different views about the purpose and 
priorities of application software. Such disagreements 
can result in inconsistent or missing requirements if they 
are not addressed. 
5. lack of contextual detail. Requirements cannot simply be 
gathered by conducting interviews or by analyzing 
existing documentation.   Observational techniques have 
been used to provide first-hand insights into the potential 
operational environment of complex, safety-critical 
systems. 
 
Statistical evidence has been gathered to demonstrate the 
importance of requirements capture in the development of 
safety-critical systems.  For example, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive’s ‘Out of Control’ project conducted a 
detailed review of the causes of software failures in process 
control applications.  Requirements issues accounted for 40% 
of the incidents, hardware failures for 26%, software bugs 
11%, maintenance issues 6% and ‘system use’ around 17% 
[7].    
 
Also, Vinter [8] analysed more than 1,000 bug reports 
produced by seven major embedded real-time systems 
projects.  He found results that are broadly similar to those 
obtained by the UK HSE:  24% of the bug reports stemmed 
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from requirements issues, functionality 25%, structure 21%, 
data 10%, implementation 5%, integration 5%, architecture 
1%, testing 7%, other 5%.  Within those bug reports that were 
associated with requirements problems, Vinter argued that 
48% could be classified as ‘misunderstandings’.  Typically, 
disagreement existed over the precise interpretation of a 
particular requirement.  19% of the bug reports that stemmed 
from requirements problems related to missing constraints. 
27% related to requirements that had been changed.  A further 
6% were classified as ‘other’ issues.  These statistical studies 
have inspired some researchers to advocate a new vision of 
safety-related requirements engineering.   One such vision 
would integrate pure safety requirements, safety-significant 
requirements, system safety requirements, and safety 
constraints in requirements repositories of requirements 
specifications [9]. 
 
Nuseibeh and Easterbrook have argued that “the primary 
measure of success of a software system is the degree to 
which it meets the purpose for which it was intended.  
Broadly speaking, software systems requirements engineering 
(RE) is the process of discovering that purpose, by identifying 
stakeholders and their needs, and documenting these in a 
form that is amenable to analysis, communication, and 
subsequent implementation” [10].  These observations 
correctly emphasize the importance of requirements 
engineering for the development of complex systems.   
 
Problems arise when such arguments become distorted by a 
form of causal asymmetry.   Requirements engineering helps 
to ensure that the software meets the primary measure of 
success.  However, this does not necessarily imply that 
software failures are all caused by a failure in requirements 
engineering.  Unfortunately, many previous academic studies 
and accident investigations seem to suffer from just this form 
of hindsight bias [11]. To paraphrase: there must have been a 
failure in requirements capture because engineers would have 
fixed the problem if they had known about it.    
 
There are further concerns about the statistical basis for the 
studies that have emphasized the importance of requirements 
engineering.  For instance, Vinter’s study was based on 
previous work by Beizer [12].  This earlier work had looked 
at more than 16,000 bug reports in major software projects 
funded by the US government.  In contrast to Vinter, Beizer 
only classified 8% of the problems as stemming from 
requirements.  It seems unlikely that the US government is so 
much better at requirements analysis than the commercial 
project teams investigated by Vinter.   Instead, the difference 
in results can be explained in terms of the classification 
systems that were used in these studies.  Beizer relied on a 
classification system with several dozen terms while Vinter 
relied on only nine top level categories.  The key point here is 
that a superficial analysis of software engineering failures 
will often focus on requirements failure, because of the 
persuasive nature of the hindsight bias mentioned above.  In 
contrast, more detailed studies in forensic engineering tend to 
focus on a host of organisational and technical issues that are 
less easily classified. 
2. Case Study 
Arguments about the role of requirements engineering in the 
failure of safety-critical systems can be illustrated by a recent 
incident involving Boeing Electronic Engine Controllers 
(EEC) [13].  These units control engine start sequencing, 
power requirements, operating temperature, turbine speeds, 
fuel flow, engine monitoring, and automatic relight, among 
other functions.  They also provide fault detection using 
EEPROMs and log error codes until they are intentionally 
cleared during maintenance.    
 
The particular incident in which we are interested was 
triggered when the fuel flow to the right engine dropped to 
zero approximately 3.5 minutes after full power was applied 
for take-off during a commercial flight. This resulted in an in-
flight shutdown for the engine.  The crew received no 
warning before the failure, but they were able to successfully 
land with only one engine. Figure 1 provides a simple Events 
and Causal Factors diagram for the incident.  Rectangles 
denote individual events, ellipses represent causal factors that 
make those events more likely. 
 
Subsequent investigations found that a failure in the right 
engine EEC removed electrical power from an engine fuel-
control metering valve.  This valve was spring loaded to 
return to the closed position when power was removed. The 
EEC removed the electrical signal from the fuel valve, 
because it had detected failures on both of its redundant 
channels.   Channel A suffered from a bit-flip error within the 
memory section of the input/output microprocessor. Unused 
memory sections should have been initialized using a positive 
charge to represent binary 1. However, some areas became 
negatively charge and were interpreted as binary zero, 
resulting in checksum failures.   
 
Further vibratory testing of the EEC indicated fracturing of 
solder joints at five resistors on the analog interface module 
circuit board of Channel B.   It was discovered that the EECs 
in other fleets had also suffered from these problems.  At first 
sight, this incident can be interpreted as a requirements 
problem similar to those identified in the second item of the 
list that opened this paper.  The programmers made incorrect 
assumptions about the reliability of the operating environment 
for their software.  The decision to initialize memory section 
of the input/output microprocessor using positive charge 
binary 1, left the system susceptible to in-flight failures if 
areas became negatively charged by individual bit-flip errors.  
This was considered to be a more likely failure mode than a 
bit-flip from negative 0 to positive 1.   In consequence, two 
months after the incident, the engine manufacturers issued a 
Service Bulletin which gave instructions for a software 
modification of the processor communication's modules to 
change the fill pattern of the unused areas of the EEPROM 
memory from hexadecimal binary 1s to binary 0s, thereby 
reducing the possibility of checksum failures.  
 
One problem with this particular analysis is the difficulty of 
determining whether particular problems stem from
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Right engine uncommanded in-flight shut-down. 
Crew observe R ENG RPM LO alert.
Crew observe RH SYS FAIL advisory.
Crew action ENGINE SHUTDOWN 
INFLIGHT checklist.
Crew complete single engine landing.
Operator maintenance 
interrogate multifunction 
control display unit (MCDU) 
Operator maintenance carry 
out right engine EEC fault 
review check 
Operator maintenance 
conduct return to 
service check. 
Operator maintenance 
conduct dry monitoring 
run. 
Operator maintenance 
conduct engine idle 
run. 
Operator maintenance fails to find faults
Operator maintenance carries out further 
EEC fault review
Several fault codes noted in EEC 
memory associated with Full Authority 
Digitel Engine Control (FADEC) system 
fault and EEC Box Fault. 
EEC and Fuel Monitoring Unit removed 
for further testing. 
EEC and FMU replaced.
Aircraft returns to service 
after ground tests. 
Flight takes off, Launceston airport. 
180s after full power for takeoff right engine fuel 
flow drops to zero. 
Confers with engine 
manufacturer. 
Climb passes 7,000ft ASL.
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Electronic Engine Controller (EEC) Failure 
 
 
inadequate requirements engineering, or from other stages of 
the software lifecycle.   For example, it might be argued that 
the initialization conditions for the EEC input/output 
microprocessor should only be considered during detailed 
specification and design, and not during requirements 
development  Equally, however, it might be argued that the 
use of positive 1 encoding violated an earlier requirement to 
ensure that the system was resilient to bit-flip errors.  Hence, 
the problem can be traced back to the verification and testing 
of a design against high-level requirements.  We shall return 
to this issue in the discussion at the end of the paper. 
 
Hindsight bias occurs when software engineers automatically 
assume that there has been a failure in requirements 
engineering simply because an accident has occurred.  This is 
dangerous if it obscures deeper engineering problems.  For 
example, ‘band aid’ software can be applied to fix new 
requirements rather than address more fundamental 
engineering issues. 
 
In the accident we are considering, investigators may focus 
on changes to version 7.0 of the EEC software rather than on  
problems in the printed circuit boards, which are illustrated in 
Figure 2.  This diagram extends the ECF modeling to identify 
more detailed causes of the EEC failure.    
 
Our earlier discussion focused on the checksum failures that 
were associated with Channel A, but did not address the 
failure of Channel B, which was also necessary in order to 
cause a failure in the dual redundant EEC for the right engine.    
The ECF diagram denotes that Channel B may have failed 
from differential thermal expansion between the printed 
circuit board and a series of interface resistors.   Over time, 
these failures contributed to ‘health-lane degradation’ which 
ultimately resulted in Channel B being shut down.  As can be 
seen, the ‘health lane degradation’ on both Channel A and 
Channel B were difficult to detect because intermittent 
failures did not always result in maintenance warnings.  The 
Australian Transport Safety Board went on to describe how
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Right Engine EEC removes power from 
engine fuel control monitoring valve
Engine fuel control monitoring valve spring 
loaded into closed position.
Right engine is starved of fuel.
Right engine uncommanded in-flight shut-down.
Dual channel failure of right engine EEC 
Assump: Channel B fails from 
intermittent loss of signal from 
solder joint fractures to resistors of 
analogue interface module circuit 
board  
Assump: healthlane degradation 
causes Channel B to shut down. 
“EEPROM input/output 
microprocessor is configured with 
positively charged hexadecimal 
binary 1s occupying unused memory 
sections”. 
Some areas of unused memory 
section of input/output 
microprocessor in Channel A 
EEPROM  become negatively 
charged with binary zeros. 
Assump: checksum failures cause 
healthlane degradation and Channel A 
shuts down. 
Thermal cycle  
induced stress due to differential 
thermal expansion between printed 
circuit board and resistor.   
Same resistor  
package used on both channels 
affects up to 7 per channel with any 
of 5 contributing to failure of one 
EEC.  
Intermittent  
healthlane degradations did not 
automatically trigger maintenance 
warnings. 
 
 
Figure 2: Detailed Analysis of the Electronic Engine Controller (EEC) Failure 
 
“the engine manufacturer further advised that they will be 
incorporating a software upgrade of the EEC to version 7.0, 
which will include an improvement to remove the possibility 
for certain intermittent failures to trigger a 'health lane' 
degradation without triggering the corresponding 
maintenance message”. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates further design issues that were not so 
prominently discussed in the official incident report and 
which might also easily be overlooked by a precipitate focus 
on requirements engineering issues.   Both of the redundant 
Channels were designed using similar resistor packs.  In 
consequence, both were vulnerable to the same thermal 
cycles.  This more detailed analysis points to more complex 
causes in the incident than the initial failure to identify 
appropriate initialization conditions for the EEPROM 
input/output microprocessor software.  It also suggests 
continuing vulnerabilities from a lack of diversity even after 
the proposed software upgrades.   
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of a second incident, involving 
the same aircraft.  Approximately three weeks after the right 
engine EEC failure, there was an in-flight loss of power to the 
left engine.  The causes appear to have been very similar.    
 
The associated EEC was also running version 6.1 of the 
software.  Subsequent inspections revealed fractures to the 
solder joints on the resistors of both redundant channels.  
Maintenance teams were able to identify an EEC fault code in 
the multifunction control display unit (MCDU) memory.    
 
As in the previous incident, the crew landed the aircraft 
without any injury.   Six days after this second incident, there 
was a further in-flight loss of power reported from a US 
aircrew.  Again, there were fractures in the solder joints 
across resistors for both of the channels. 
 
This case study initially focused on requirements problems 
associated with the initialisation of the EEC’s EEPROM 
input/output microprocessor.  Subsequently we identified 
software problems in logging intermittent failures during 
health lane monitoring.   Although these problems can be 
linked back to the requirements analysis for the EEC 
application, Figures 2 and 3 show that they must be placed in 
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4/10/2002: Crew complete single 
engine landing.
4/8/2002: Right Engine EEC installed, software v6.1 (most recent). 
Right Engine EEC 
accumulates 426.7 hours 
flying time, 393 cycles. 
30/10/2002: B717-200 sustains in-
flight shutdown of right engine. 
B717-200 EEC 
accumulates 6,700 hours 
flying time. 
Fracture of solder joints at 
5 resistors on Channel A of 
analogue interface unit. 
Fracture of solder joints at 
10 resistors on Channel B 
of analogue interface unit. 
Dual channel failure of right engine 
electronic engine controller (EEC)  
Dual channel failure of right engine 
electronic engine controller (EEC)  
Aircraft returns to service after 
ground tests. 
24/10/2002: Left engine spools down
24/10/2002: Crew complete single engine landing.
Fracture of solder joints at 
6 resistors on Channel A of 
analogue interface unit. 
Fracture of solder joints at 
4 resistors on Channel A of 
analogue interface unit. 
24/10/2002 Possible dual channel 
failure of LEFT  engine electronic 
engine controller (EEC)  
LEFT Engine EEC 
accumulates 4,686.4 
hours flying time, 4,311 
cycles. 
LEFT  
Engine EEC running 
software v6.1. 
Assump: Thermal cycle  
induced stress due to differential 
thermal expansion between printed 
circuit board and resistor.   
Assump: Thermal cycle  
induced stress due to differential 
thermal expansion between printed 
circuit board and resistor.   
Assump: Thermal cycle  
induced stress due to differential 
thermal expansion between printed 
circuit board and resistor.   
Maintenance notice a fault code relating 
to EEC logged on MCDU memory. 
EEC and FMU replaced
Aircraft returns to service after ground tests.
 
Figure 3: Similar Incidents of Electronic Engine Controller  
 
the context of several wider engineering issues.   In particular, 
any focus on software requirements issues must be balanced 
against a lack of diversity in the resistor arrays of both 
channels and the configuration of the PCBs that made then 
susceptible to thermal cycles. 
 
The key point here is not to deny that there were requirements 
problems in this case study.  In contrast, the intention is to 
warn against the myopia that occasionally affects software 
engineering accounts of major failures [3].  For example, 
there are well-developed research communities in the field of 
requirements engineering.   This increases the likelihood that 
research projects will focus on these aspects of adverse events 
[11].  However, in this case study, equal attention should be 
paid to the wider engineering issues mention above.  It is also 
important to consider the role of software engineering in 
monitoring the error codes produced by the EEC and logged 
in MCDU memory.   It seems remarkable that several almost 
identical failures were logged within weeks of the first EEC 
failure.   This suggests an increased awareness of the possible 
failure modes given successive updates from the 
manufacturer.  There have been a number of recent research 
and development initiatives to support pattern recognition and 
self-diagnosis of potential failure modes from on-board 
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systems [14].  However, this work is largely driven by 
aviation specialists and cannot easily be compared to the mass 
of recent projects in the more general field of requirements 
engineering. 
 
Figure 4 reinforces many of the points made in previous 
paragraphs by annotating an ECF with specific actions taken 
by the manufacturer in response to this incident.  Shaded 
rectangles denote interventions that address diverse causes 
ranging from the initialization requirements for the EEPROM 
input/output microprocessor through to the software alerts for 
health lane degradation to ‘work arounds’ for the PCB design 
that left resistor arrays susceptible to thermal stress.   As can 
be seen, these recommendations and notices did not simply 
focus on the software requirements issues but covered diverse 
aspects of the engineering of the EEC systems. 
 
 
 
 
Right Engine EEC removes power 
from engine fuel control monitoring 
valve 
Flight takes off, Launceston airport. 
Climb passes 7,000ft ASL. 
Engine fuel control monitoring valve 
spring loaded into closed position. 
Right engine is starved of fuel. 
Right engine uncommanded in-flight 
shut-down. 
Dual channel failure of right engine 
electronic engine controller (EEC)  
Assump: Channel B fails 
from intermittent loss of 
signal from solder joint 
fractures to resistors of 
analogue interface 
module circuit board  
Assump: healthlane 
degradation causes 
Channel B to shut down. 
“EEPROM input/output 
microprocessor is configured with 
positively charged hexadecimal 
binary 1s occupying unused memory 
sections”. 
Some areas of unused memory 
section of input/output 
microprocessor in Channel A 
EEPROM become negatively 
charged with binary zeros. 
Assump: checksum failures 
cause healthlane degradation 
and Channel A shuts down. 
Thermal cycle  
induced stress due to differential 
thermal expansion between printed 
circuit board and resistor.   
Same resistor  
pack used on both 
channels.   
20/1/2003: Manufacturer 
service bulletin SB-BR700-
73-900316 fleet operators 
told of inspections and 
modifications to improve EEC 
reliability, 10 changes to be 
made at earliest opportunity 
without affecting flight 
schedule.  Requires EEC 
return to manufacturer. 
20/12/2002: 
Manufacturer service 
bulletin SB-BR700-73-
101401 instructions to 
reduce stress on 
resistors by attaching 
them to analogue 
interface module circuit 
board and connect them 
to original solder pad by 
flying leads.  Compliance 
at next shop visit for EEC 
repair or by manufacturer 
(not mandatory). 
27/11/2002: Manufacturer issues 
update on testing of Fuel Metering 
Unit and EEC 
20/12/2002: 
Manufacturer notice on 
in-flight shutdown & 
engine restart 
procedures.  Advises of 
harness installation 
procedures and review of 
fault codes and advises 
interrogation of MCDU 
every 50 flight hours. 
Manufacturer incorporates 
software upgrade for EEC v7.0, 
removes “possibility of certain 
intermittent failures to trigger a 
‘health lane’ degradation without 
triggering the corresponding 
maintenance message”. 
17/1/2003: Manufacturer 
service bulletin SB-BR700-
73-101404 software 
modification for processors 
communications modules 
(A3/A4) to change pattern 
of unused areas of 
EEPROM from 
hexadecimal binary 1’s to 
0’s reducing possibility of 
checksum failure.  
Compliance on next EEC 
repair or by manufacturer 
(not mandatory). 
25/10/2002: Manufacturer issues 
warning over in-flight shutdown event 
and lists warning codes witnessed. 
 
 
Figure 4: Safety Management Perspective on Electronic Engine Controller (EEC) Failure 
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Similar comments can be made about the regulatory 
organizations.   Immediately following the first incident, the 
relevant civil aviation authority directed the aircraft operator 
to review all fault codes at the end of each day for the 
‘occurrence aircraft’ until further notice.  This requirement 
was later modified to include an MCDU review at every 
airport for which there was engineering support. This incident 
is unusual because one might have expected the 
recommended review to have identified precursors to the EEC 
fault codes that were logged when the second incident 
occurred (see figure 3).   However, the official report avoids 
any comment about the way in which a second failure 
occurred even though the civil aviation authority had taken 
steps to avoid such a recurrence through monitoring the 
software logs.   Following the failure of the left engine, 
additional requirements were developed to ensure a review of 
fault codes at the end of each day's flying for all operator 
aircraft. They also required a review of fault codes after each 
sector where engineering support was available to include all 
of the operator’s aircraft of the same type involved in this 
incident.  
In addition to the steps taken by the manufacturer and the 
regulator, the aircraft operator also reacted to this incident in 
several different ways.   They required that the MCDU was 
interrogated for EEC faults after each flight into a manned 
port. Recurring faults would result in the EEC being replaced.  
All of the associated codes and corrective actions were to be 
reported to the national civil aviation authority.   The EEC 
PCB’s were modified to reduce the problems created by 
thermal cycling of the resistors across all of the fleet.  
Following any modification, the MCDU interrogation was to 
continue after every flight into an airport with a service 
engineering capability for two weeks.  This period would then 
be extended to regular service intervals once the reliability of 
the modifications had been established.  All EECs returned to 
the manufacturer were to be upgraded, using the software 
modifications mentioned before.  The entire fleet was 
modified by the first quarter of 2004.  
The key point here is to illustrate the diverse approaches that 
were used to address the many different causes of this 
incident.   As noted, any focus on requirements issues must 
not distract from the wider engineering issues that concern the 
manufacturer, operator and regulator.  These 
recommendations illustrate another critical point; none of 
them deal directly with the problems of requirements 
engineering.  It is remarkable how few accident reports ever 
deal directly with development issues [11].    
 
This can be interpreted in one of two ways.  Perhaps, the lack 
of recommendations dealing with requirements engineering 
illustrates an important omission on the part of investigatory 
agencies that are otherwise missing important opportunities to 
prevent similar failures from affecting future products that are 
engineered using the same processes.  Alternatively, such 
omissions might reflect the pragmatic view that it is 
impossible to develop perfect requirements and that it is more 
profitable to focus on ensuring the immediate safety of 
existing systems without imposing undue constraints on the 
processes that might used to guide the development of future 
systems. 
3. Discussion: Biases in Forensic Software 
Engineering 
The previous case illustrates the complexity of engineering 
failures, which can often be obscured by simple prima facea 
claims that accidents stem from inadequate requirements 
gathering.  Forensic software engineering is also subject to 
other forms of bias.  For instance, many researchers have a 
vested interest in promoting particular techniques.  Hence, it 
is possible to read articles that are based on counter factual 
propositions of the form ‘accident A would have been 
avoided if technique X or Y had been avoided’.  Of course, 
such arguments are non-truth functional.   The accident did 
occur and hence we must make a judgment based on 
suppositions about what might have happened if different 
requirements engineering practices had been followed.    
 
For the case study, it is difficult to know what evidence could 
be recruited to demonstrate that the EEC fault code reporting 
mechanisms would have been improved if the original units 
had been developed using formal methods or any other 
approach.  Hansen and Gullesen illustrate one approach when 
they use UML to identify faults that were deliberately 
injected into a dual channel architecture similar to that 
described in our case study [15].  However, demonstrating 
that a failure mode can  be detected using a requirements 
engineering technique is quite different from showing that it 
would have identified the problems that lead to particular 
accidents and incidents.  In other words, such demonstrations 
often suffer from the hindsight bias mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
Bias can be interpreted as influences that prevent objective 
consideration of an issue or situation.  These influences can 
lead to or be reinforced by the use of logical fallacies to 
support the findings of accident investigations.  In particular, 
they often seem to be used to justify the identification of 
requirements failure in the aftermath of software related 
incidents and accidents.    For example, the ‘post hoc ergo 
propter hoc’ fallacy occurs when arguments move from a 
premise of the form "A preceded B" to a conclusion of the 
form "A caused B".  Requirements engineering takes place in 
the earliest stages of many development projects.  Hence, 
analysts may incorrectly assume that by tracing the causes of 
an adverse event into these initial stages, they are also tracing 
the underlying, systemic causes of an accident or incident.   
Caspers Jones recognised this when he argued that the root 
causes of software failure should be traced back to faulty 
management and quality control practices rather than to 
requirements processes [16].  It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to capture fully all of the competing requirements 
that software must continue to satisfy during its lifetime, 
hence we should focus more on the processes that are 
intended to trap key requirements problems during a software 
project.  In this view, our case study incident can be viewed 
as a success since redundancy prevented loss of life, and the 
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problems with EEC fault code reporting were corrected once 
the issue had been identified. 
 
Further fallacies can be identified in the reasoning that is used 
to identify requirements problems in the causes of incidents 
and accidents.  For example ‘argumentum ad ignorantium’ 
occurs when a proposition is claimed to be true because it has 
not been shown to be false, or vice versa. In our case study, 
we might assume that poor requirements analysis led to the 
lack of prominent error code reporting for the EEC, because 
the accident report does not present evidence in support of the 
techniques that were used by the manufacturer.   
 
We have already met several other fallacies in the opening 
sections of this paper.  For instance, ‘dicto simpliciter’ relies 
on sweeping generalizations of the form ‘90% of all accidents 
are due to requirements failure’.   Similarly, arguments ‘ad 
verecundiam’ are based on appeals to authority.  For instance, 
where requirements problems are diagnosed by reference to 
previous work that is itself not firmly based on empirical 
observations but on other forms of fallacy, mentioned above. 
4 Caveats and Criticisms 
A number of important caveats may be raised about the 
analysis in this paper.   In particular, we have conducted a 
relatively detailed analysis of a single accident.   This is a 
deliberate decision.   The intention has been to expose the 
complex interactions between software requirements 
engineering and problems in the underlying avionics.   Our 
aim has been deliberately to avoid the high-level statistical 
surveys that focus on a small number of software-specific 
problems.   However, we would argue that the EEC case 
study is typical of a much larger class of accidents or 
incidents.   For example, the Ariane 5 incident that was 
mentioned in the opening sections of this paper stemmed 
from a very similar interaction between software 
requirements and the underlying hardware. 
 
There are further differences between our work and the earlier 
studies of both Beizer and Vintner.  These surveys focused 
more narrowly on the importance of software lifecycle 
processes on bug reports.  In contrast, this paper focuses on 
the wider causes of accidents and incidents that partly stem 
from software related problems.   These differences hint at a 
more general proposition.   The statistical work, especially the 
studies by Vinter, demonstrates the importance of 
requirements failure as a source of bugs that are documented 
in project reports.  However, our analysis of the interplay 
between requirements failure and other problems in the wider 
engineering of complex systems suggests that greater 
attention should be paid to the interaction between these 
issues as a cause of major failures.   
 
Nuseibeh and Easterbrook have argued that “the demand for 
better, faster, and more usable software systems will continue, 
and requirements engineering will therefore continue to 
evolve in order to deal with different development scenarios. 
We believe that effective RE will continue to play a key role 
in determining the success or failure of projects, and in 
determining the quality of systems that are delivered”.  Our 
work confirms this analysis but we would go on to stress two 
points of difference.   Firstly, it seems unlikely that we will 
ever be able to entirely eliminate the broad class of problems 
that are being ascribed to failures in requirements 
engineering.  Secondly, if this is the case we must urgently 
look at the ways in which such failures might exhibit 
themselves within the engineering of complex systems.   
5 Concluding Remarks 
A large number of accident investigations have identified the 
role that inadequate requirements engineering plays in the 
failure of safety-critical software [11].  These findings have 
been supported by several large scale surveys of bug reports 
in safety-critical projects.  However, such findings may be 
misleading.   It is difficult to distinguish between failures in 
requirements engineering and, for instance, inadequate testing 
or poor design techniques.  In consequence, statistical surveys 
are often undermined by poor inter-analyst reliability. 
 
Further pitfalls arise from the assumption that inadequate 
requirements engineering is a cause of all software related 
accidents for which the system fails to meet its requirements.  
There is a danger of hindsight bias; it is easy to identify 
problems after an accident has occurred.  However, it can be 
far harder to establish that an accident might have been 
avoided if alternate requirements engineering processes had 
been employed. 
 
This paper has used a case study, focussing on the failure of 
redundant dual channel EEC, to illustrate these arguments.   
This incident stemmed in part from software engineering 
problems, in particular the use of positive binary-1 
initialisation for the input/output microprocessor EEPROM 
created potential vulnerabilities.  These issues can be traced 
back to relatively early stages in the development process and 
can be ascribed to requirements engineering failures, for 
example in identifying likely environmental factors that 
would lead to bit-flip errors with such positive encodings.   
However, a more sustained analysis of the case study helped 
to show the more complex causes of the incident.  Many of 
these involved hardware issues and have been resolved, 
including the vulnerability of the PCBs to thermal cycles.  
Others relate to design factors, such as the lack of diversity in 
redundant channels. 
 
Our intention has not been to deny the importance of 
requirements engineering as a cause of software related 
failures in safety-critical systems.  In contrast, the intention 
has been to provoke further debate within the emerging field 
of forensic software engineering.  In particular, we would 
urge greater caution in identifying requirements failure as a 
‘catch-all’ cause of adverse events.  We would also welcome 
insights into why so few accident investigation agencies make 
recommendations about appropriate requirements engineering 
techniques when so many researchers have focused on these 
‘causes’. 
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